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ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 
In recent years, global geo-econo-
mic transformations have been consi-
derably affected by the development of 
the People’s Republic of China, its re-
viving leadership and ambitions, and 
its increasing efforts to reformat and 
integrate the Eurasian space. The One 
Belt — One Road Initiative is a mani-
festo and a tool to advance China’s 
long-term geostrategic interests that 
spread to the bordering states and re-
gions and to the prospects of their so-
cioeconomic development. The initiati-
ve encompasses transportation and lo-
gistics, production and investment, fi-
nances, research and technology, hu-
manitarian affairs, and foreign policy.  
In this article, we will highlight the 
key geoeconomic and geopolitical 
aspects of the One Belt — One Road 
initiative implementation, based on the 
Chinese and Russian studies. Another 
goal is to weigh up the risks and bene-
fits associated with the extension of the 
project to Russian territories. Special 
attention is paid to Russia’s western 
borderlands — 17 regions that account 
for 8.6 % of the country’s territory, 
17.4 % of the total GRP, and 20.8 % of 
the national population.  
We analyse the factors in effect — 
including geopolitical ones, as well as 
current trends in the development of 
Russia’s western borderlands. It is 
shown that the inclusion into the Chi-
nese Eurasian integration initiatives 
creates additional incentives for a po-
sitive re-evaluation of the Russian spa-
ce as a whole and holds special rele-
vance for Russia’s western border-
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lands. We analyse the possibility of including Russia’s Baltic regions — the in-
frastructural and economic island of the Kaliningrad exclave among them — 
into the One Belt — One Road Initiative. 
 
Keywords: geoeconomics, China, Eurasia, transport and logistics corridors, 
regional development, core-periphery system, Russia’s western borderlands 
 
Introduction 
 
As the highly influential theoretical geographer, David Harvey has 
repeatedly stressed [1; 2], a sine qua non of productive activities is the 
‘spatial fix’ attained through the construction and reconstruction of 
transportation and logistics infrastructure, production facilities, reside-
ntial housing, etc. On this basis, space is ‘produced’ repeatedly. In the 
modern geoconomic architectonics, the scale, potential, and directions of 
dominant spatial changes are largely affected by the ‘explosive’ eco-
nomic growth of the People’s Republic of China1 and the country’s 
geostrategic, marketing, financial, and investment interests. A geo-ideo-
logical manifesto and a tailored strategy enjoying international, resource, 
and technological support is the One Belt One Road Initiative (一带一路). 
A tool to reformat the Eurasian economic space, the national strategy has 
given rise to hundreds of projects [3—5]. Its complete implementation 
will create new socioeconomic risks and opportunities for the vast 
territories of Eurasian periphery and semi-periphery. This article is an 
attempt to highlight the key geoeconomic and geopolitical aspects of the 
One Belt One Road initiative and to estimate the prospects of Russia’s 
Western borderlands for the integration into the Chinese project. 
 
The One Belt One Road Initiative as a Geostrategy  
and a Megaproject Aimed to Reformat the Eurasian space 
 
The One Belt One Road concept was first introduced by the President 
of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, in autumn 2013. In less 
than a year, it was named the key element of the Chinese leadership’s 
foreign policy course [6]. In March 2015, a detailed implementation plan 
was published (‘Excellent Prospects and Practical Steps…), which inco-
                                                     
1 According to the World Bank, the PCR accounted for 1.8 % of the gross world 
product, at the official exchange rate, in 1992, for 3.6 % in 2000, 12.6 % in 2013, 
and 14.9 % in 2015. The GDP (PPP) of the emerging lobal leader, whose ascen-
sion has been predicted by leading analysts, reached 18.6 % in 2017, or 1.22 
times that of the US and 1.18 times that of the EU. 
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rporated such priority aspects as transnational interactions, interconnec-
tion of member states’ transportation infrastructures, cooperation in 
energy, agriculture, and other sectors, and favourable conditions for 
investment and free trade [7;8]. The most probable routes, or geostrategic 
targets, of the One Road One Belt Initiative were presented at the same 
time. Furthering the interest of the PRC, these routes run across Eurasia 
and the adjacent seas (see figure). 
 
 
 
Fig. Priority routes of the One Road One Belt Initiative* 
 
* compiled based on [6; 9—11]. 
 
Partly following the navigation routes of ancient Chinese seafarers 
[12], the One Belt runs along the main maritime arteries of today [13, 
14]. Holding the historical memories2 of the thoroughfare that crossed 
Iran, Iraq, and Syria to link China to the western Mediterranean, the One 
Road is a reflection of China’s terrestrial geoeconomic priorities. As 
early as 2016, it became evident that the initiative would not limit itself 
to transportation and logistics but would include investment, industrial, 
R&D, financial and humanitarian components. China announced its 
intent to support international research projects in digital economy, 
nanotechnology, biotechnology, and other areas, initiated by members of 
the One Road One Belt Initiative. Support actions include the estab-
lishment and equipment of shared laboratories, research and academic 
                                                     
2 It was brought back to life and invested with renewed urgency by the Silk 
Road (die Seidenstraße) geoconcept found in the works of the German geogra-
pher F F von Richthofen and historian A Hermann [9]. 
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exchange, and other measures. As the prominent Chinese geographer Liu 
Wei Don stresses, the One Belt One Road Initiative opens up new hori-
zons of economic globalisation through promoting social justice, com-
bating poverty, offering new development trajectories, and supporting 
cultural diversity [15; 16]. 
An essential part of systematic efforts to further the development the 
People’s Republic of China, to overcome asymmetry between the count-
ry’s eastern and western provinces [11; 18; 19], to open up new markets, 
and to raise the country’s geoeconomic stature through ‘creative expan-
sion’ [5], the One Belt One Road Initiative has become a conceptual fra-
mework for China’s emerging pan-Eurasian leadership in trade, pro-
duction, investment, and finance. Committed to the ‘win-win’ and mutual 
trust principles [10; 17], the Initiative has been reported to involve 65 
countries with a total population of 4.4 billion people [20]. Moving out of 
the shadow [21], China is expected [22] to become the greatest power in 
the world. However, a sustainable full-scale implementation of the 
initiative requires both a stable transportation and logistics link to the still 
economically powerful Europe and an access to the resource potential of 
Central, South, and Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern states. This may 
demand boosting the industrial development of the regions’ peripheries 
[23]. As of today, the PRC is dominating the markets of Pakistan, 
Tajikistan, Kirgizia, Iran, and Mongolia. The country has long-term 
interests in Japan, India, the states of the Persian Gulf, and other 
countries [24]. As Chinese analysts cogently argue, Russia and its regions 
can make an important contribution to the One Belt One Road Initiative 
[25; 26]. 
 
Risks and opportunities posed by the One Belt One Road Initiative  
to Russia: The geoeconomic and geopolitical aspects 
 
The current Russian-Chinese relations do not rest solely on the long-
term and diverse experience of geographical neighbourhood — an 
important factor of transboundary cooperation and the development of 
the vast Russian-Chinese borderland [27]. Another foundation of the 
countries’ relations is bilateral trade. As of the beginning of 2018, the 
PRC accounted for the unprecedented 17.2 % of Russia’s international 
trade. Moreover, amid the conflict between Russia and the West, which 
has been ongoing since 2014, the similarity between Russia and China’s 
position and the Eurasian interdependence between the two countries are 
becoming increasingly pronounced. 
The countries’ social and geographical parameters place Russia and 
China among the few giant states [28]. However, the balance of power 
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between the two countries is constantly changing. Russia’s advantage is 
that its jurisdiction extends to a very large segment of Eurasia — 31.5 % 
of the continent’s area. The country boasts a massive geo-historical 
heritage, although part of it was wasted in the post-Soviet period. Rus-
sia’s military and strategic influence has been growing over the past de-
cade. According to S. Karaganov, Russia is de facto the largest provi-
der of security in the world [22]. It is also noteworthy that the country 
is taking attempts — some of them successful [29] — to develop Russian-
centred integration formats (the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
and the Eurasian Economic Union). However, this stands in stark contrast 
to the country’s geoeconomic position. The gap between the sizes of the 
Russian and Chinese economies is steadily growing. In 1992, the count-
ries were at near-parity in terms of GDP. However, the GDP of China 
was 4.7 times that of Russia in 2000 and 8.3 times in 2015. According to 
the World Bank, the PRC accounts for almost a quarter of the GDP of 
Eurasia, whereas Russia’s contribution to the continent’s GDP is 2.83 % 
and that of all the EAEU countries 3.37 %. At purchasing power parity, 
China accounts for 26.5 %, and Russia for only 4.4 % of the GDP of 
Eurasia. Against this background, the 2014—20153 Russian-Chinese 
agreements on the harmonisation of Eurasian integration initiatives take 
not only an economic but also a geopolitical character, the latter being 
prevalent. These agreements are declarations and shapers of a new 
Eurasian reality, as well as logical attempts to avoid a collision of 
interests through outlining strategic common grounds. 
It is important to understand that China’s integration project — which 
is very much in line with the idea of a ‘turn to the East’, dominant across 
Russian research and political discourse, and with that of a ‘Big Eurasian 
Partnership’ [30—32]) — is aimed to promote the interests of the 
‘Middle Kingdom’ and to develop its periphery. Against this background, 
it would be unwise for Russia to count on any special treatment. Giving 
priority to the ‘northern’ corridor of the One Road — the one that runs 
across Russia — is not beneficial to China. The southern corridor, which 
crosses Central Asia, Pakistan, Iran, South Caucasus and Middle Eastern 
states, provides access to sixteen countries, home to 538 million people. 
In the last decade, the demographic potential of these states has increased 
by 18 %. Thus, they are more likely than Russia to show accelerated rates 
of socioeconomic growth. Moreover, their incorporation into the area of 
China’s interests is not associated with significant geostrategic risks, as it 
might be in the case of Russia. 
However, one should not overestimate the chance (and possible 
negative consequences) of the One Road’s Russian direction being 
                                                     
3 中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于深化全面战略协作伙伴关系、倡导合
作共赢的联合声明，莫斯科，2015年5月8日。(Joint Statement on Coopera-
tion on the Construction of Joint Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road 
Economic Belt, Москва, May 08, 2015) http://www. kremlin. ru/supplement/4971 
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ignored. Russian authors [33] have addressed these concerns in their 
research works. In line with the established tradition, the PRC will most 
likely diversify its transcontinental routes. Probably, China will take part 
in the Northern Sea Route projects and the exploration of the Russian 
region of the Arctic. However, sea freight traffic — the One Belt, in 
China’s case — will remain a priority because of the huge difference in 
sea and railway freight rates. The same holds true for Russia, which has 
been expanding the infrastructure of its Baltic and Black Sea and Pacific 
Ocean ports [34; 35] to boost the development of strategically valuable 
coastal territories. Naturally, Euro-Chinese trade will not dominate the 
Eurasian geoeconomy forever, as it does today. The development of the 
countries of South and South East Asia — partly prompted by Chinese 
initiatives — will inevitably turn the European subcontinent into one of 
equally powerful economic centres. It is in the interests of both Russia 
and China to coordinate their efforts and to build and modernise not only 
latitudinal East — West corridor but also the Eurasian communications 
infrastructure as a whole, including its longitudinal Northeast corridors. 
Common Russian-Chinese goals and shared responsibility are emerging 
in the field of security. Both countries seek the improvement of the 
political, social, and, in a long-term perspective, environmental situation 
in the countries south of Russia’s border. The geopolitical congruity of 
Russia’s and China’s Eurasian efforts is creating a solid foundation for 
upcoming large joint infrastructure projects, for the much needed colla-
borations in research and technology (which are already taking place in 
the defence industry [36]), and for prioritising the Russian direction 
within the One Belt One Road Initiative. Engagement in Chinese Eura-
sian integration initiatives prompts a positive ‘revision’ of the whole Rus-
sian space, which is asymmetric, poorly integrated, sparsely populated 
and insufficiently involved in the national economy [37]. Although it 
may seem paradoxical, the above considerations and increasing geo-
political risks have lent urgency to the incorporation of Russia’s western 
regions, including border and coastal territories, into the One Belt One 
Road Initiative. 
 
Russia’s Borderlands: Society and Geography  
in a Changing Eurasian Context 
 
Russia’s western borderlands (RWB) are a multiscale, multifaceted, 
non-static phenomenon with blurred spatial boundaries.4 Incorporating 
the territories that serve as a barrier between Russia and the West (in the 
military, political, and civilizational sense) and yet ensure contact bet-
ween them, the U-shaped Western borderlands skirt Russia’s north-
                                                     
4 The content of the ‘Russian borderlands’ category may vary significantly and 
accommodate a most broad interpretation: ‘… lands, countries, and peoples on 
either side of our new and traditional borders’ [43, с. 3] 
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western and southwestern peripheries. At the same time, in terms of loca-
tion, mentality, and institutions, RWB are part of the metaregional trans-
Eurasian limitrophe, or buffer, structures, the so-called ‘strait’ territories 
[38]): the Intermarium [39], the Baltic region [40], the Black Sea Region 
[41], and the Barents Region [42]. Serving as both a façade and a buffer, 
as border and transboundary space, these territories are closely integrated 
into the current national architectonics — the country’s core-periphery 
structure and the Moscow-centric system. Russia’s borderlands include 
not only regional and municipal frameworks contiguous with the national 
borders but also numerous semi-external elements. The latter extend to 
transportation, logistics, customs and border infrastructure, etc. Thus, it is 
logical to consider the RWB as comprising 17 Russian border or coastal 
regions, four of them having only maritime boundaries (see table). 
 
Russian Western borderlands at the regional level:  
Key economic and population characteristics 
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Northern segment 
Arkhangel
sk region 
2.4 0.6 0.8 0.5 – 5.2 — — (3B1) 
Nenets 
autonomo
us region 
1.0 0.3 0.03 0.0 + 4.8 — — (3B2) 
Murmans
k region 
0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 – 4.6 — Murmansk 
(51.7) 
(3B1) 
Republic 
of Karelia 
1.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 – 2.5 — — (3C1) 
North-western (Baltic) segment 
Saint  
Petersburg 
0.01 4.7 3.6 7.9 + 7.8 Saint Pe-
tersburg 
(approxima-
tely 6.5 m 
people) 
Big port  
Saint  
Petersburg 
(53.6) 
(1A) 
Leningrad  
region 
0.5 1.3 1.2 1.6 + 4.2 — Ust-Luga  
(103.3);  
Primorsk  
(57.6);  
Visotsk  
(17.5) 
(3A1) 
Kalinin-
grad 
region 
0.1 0.5 0.7 1.5 + 4.7 Kaliningrad 
(approxima-
tely 600,000 
people)
Kaliningrad 
(13.8) 
(3B1) 
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End of table  
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Pskov 
region 
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 – 4.3 — — (3B2) 
Western segment
Smolensk 
region 
0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 – 3.1 — — (3B1) 
Bryansk 
region 
0.2 0.4 0.8 0.2 – 4.3 — — (3B1) 
Kursk 
region 
0.2 0.5 0.8 0.2 – 0.3 Kursk 
(550,000  
people)
— (3A1) 
Belgorod 
region 
0.2 1.0 1.1 0.8 + 1.4 — — (2A) 
Voronezh 
region 
0.3 1.3 1.6 0.4 0.0 Voronezh 
(1.1 m  
people)
— (3A1) 
South-western (Black Sea) segment
Rostov 
region 
0.6 1.8 2.9 1.7 – 1.1 Rostov 
(over 2 m  
people)
Rostov-on-
Don (14.9) 
(2A) 
Krasnodar 
region 
0.4 3.0 3.8 2.0 + 6.5 Krasnodar 
(approxim-
tely 1.2 m 
people); 
Sochi —  
Tuapse  
(550,000  
people) 
Novoros-
siysk  
(147.4);  
Tuapse  
(26.6);  
Port  
Kavkaz  
(35.3);  
Taman  
(14.9)
(1A) 
Republic  
of Crimea 
0.2 0.4 1.3 0.02 – 2.6 Sevastopol
—  
Yalta 
(550,000  
people)
— (3B1) 
Sevastopol 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 + 12.9 — (3B2) 
 
* According to the Federal State Statistics Service 
** According to the Association of Russian Commercial Seaports (http:// 
www.morport.com/) 
*** Investment ranking according to the Expert RA rating agency (https:// 
raexpert. ru/: (1A) is maximum potential — minimum risk; (2A) is medium 
potential — minimum risk; (3A1) is low potential — minimum risk; (3B1) is 
low potential — moderate risk; (3B2) is insignificant potential — moderate risk; 
(3C1) is low potential — high risk. 
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Surrounded by multiple neighbourhoods [28], Russia has an econo-
mic and settlement framework that is Europe-centric [30], or skewed west-
ward. Diverse and [44] still germinating, the Western borderlands emerged 
in their current configuration just over a quarter of a century ago — almost 
71 % of Russia’s 5750 km western land border is post-Soviet. Neverthe-
less, the countries western regions are far from being periphery in terms 
of their socioeconomic development, which is proven by statistics. 
Occupying 8.6 % of the country’s territory, the RWB account for 17.4 % 
of its GDP and 20.8 % of the total national population. 
Amid globalisation, the ‘opening up’ of the transforming Russian eco-
nomy, and the growing economic gap between Russia and the West 
(which was especially pronounced in the 1990s), the Western borderlands 
were assuming leadership in transportation and transit, resources and raw 
materials, agriculture and manufacturing. In 2017, Russia’s western ter-
minals accounted for 73 % of the cargo handled by seaports nationwide. 
Symptomatically, the RWB regions handle 18.1 % of Russia’s internatio-
nal trade. The Western borderlands are home to the largest national trade 
and logistics hubs — Saint Petersburg, Kaliningrad, and Novorossiysk. 
They are centres for production, technology, innovations, and education. 
The Saint Petersburg, Rostov, Voronezh, and Krasnodar agglomerations 
boast strong consumer and investment demand. Notably, with the excep-
tion of the northern segment and the Bryansk and Pskov regions, the 
RWB have a positive net migration. The resulting favourable demogra-
phic and economic effects corroborate the idea of the advanced develop-
ment of capital and coastal regions [45—47] and fit well with the coasta-
lisation principle [48] — the gravitation of population, manufacturing 
facilities, and infrastructure towards coastal areas. The historical path-
dependence reinforced by prevalent post-Soviet trends predetermined the 
alternating/zonal/insular pattern of the RWB economic and settlement 
landscape. The polymorphism of the Western borderlands and their sig-
nificance for the country has come strongly to the fore amid the geopo-
litical and geoeconomic turbulence observed since 2014. 
The Western borderlands were joined by the Crimean peninsula. The 
territory of a controversial geopolitical status and restricted geoeconomic 
capabilities, it became de facto a national investment priority: in 2014—2017, 
fixed capital investment in the two Crimean regions increased 4.9-fold. 
With the national borders with Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and other 
countries assuming a pronounced barrier function, traditional transboun-
dary contacts were broken off and the Kaliningrad region was turning 
into an island. Affected economically and infrastructurally, Russia’s ex-
clave was faced with the isolation of the power transmission system and 
partial termination of transboundary cooperation. Against this back-
ground, the flow of goods and raw materials along the major — Baltic 
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and Black Sea — transport corridors [49] was growing. The socioeco-
nomic potential of the RWB was boosted not only by the preparation for 
2018 FIFA World Cup (the host cities include Saint Petersburg, Kalinin-
grad, Rostov-on-Don, and Sochi) but also by the strengthening of milita-
ry presence and the defence industry in the area. During the downturn of 
2015—2016, the economies of thirteen out of the seventeen RWB regions 
were growing. Nine regions were witnessing an increase in investment. 
The socio-geographical characteristics of the RWB regions — a fa-
vourable geography for transport and transit, an established settlement 
system, a developed infrastructure, major producers’ orientation to ex-
port, and experience in transboundary cooperation [49—51] — are crea-
ting new opportunities. At the same time, the growing rift between Rus-
sia and the West, which is aggravated by the ‘blurred’ identity of some 
RWB segments and the neighbourhood-related stress [52], necessitates 
geoeconomic diversification. In this content, new prospects may lie with 
the Chinese Eurasian integration project. 
 
Incorporating Russian’s Western Borderlands Regions into  
the One Belt One Road Initiative:  
Priorities and Possibilities 
 
The rates, directions, and the very possibility of China’s geoeconomic 
exploration of Russian space, including the RWB, depend on the 
structures, functions, resources, logistics, and other characteristics of 
Russian territories. Most probably, the incorporation of Russia’s eco-
nomy into the One Belt One Road Initiative will start from the country’s 
major centres, which are already familiar to Chinese businesses. One of 
them is Saint Petersburg.5 It is safe to assume that the harmonisation of 
the new Eurasian integration megaproject with the targets and opportuni-
ties of the RWB will draw on the experiences of Western partners and the 
performance of industrial, including transboundary, clusters with Wes-
tern participation. In particular, this will help to attract Chinese invest-
ment in automobile assembly projects not only in the Saint Petersburg 
                                                     
5 A representative office of the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim 
Bank) is quartered in Saint Petersburg. Since 2005, Chinese businesses have 
been running a large real estate development project — the Baltic Pearl. A Rus-
sian-Chinese business park and a logistics hub of the Alibaba Group are being 
built in the region. There are regular direct flights to Ürümqi, Shanghai, and Bei-
jing and charter flights to Beijing, Wuhan, Macao, and Taipei from the Pulkovo 
airport in Saint Petersburg. Scheduled air services invigorate business communi-
cations and attract thousands of tourists to the city [53]. 
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agglomeration, which accounts for 27 % of national automobile produc-
tion, but also in the Kaliningrad region. From the perspective of the Chi-
nese market, the latter region opens up an even more attractive opportu-
nity of investing in the amber mining and processing industry. 
In the northern RWB segment, Chinese businesses — whose prefe-
rences are not yet completely clear — may be interested in Murmansk 
and Arkhangelsk as hubs, an Arctic exploration foothold, and the capitals 
of regions with a significant resource potential for fertilizer production 
and metallurgy. As to the western and Southern (Black Sea) borderlands, 
the Chinese may show interests in the agro-climatic resources and the 
related horticulture clusters, most of which are export-oriented [49]. These 
clusters — spanning Russia’s border regions from Smolensk to Crimea — 
account for 30 % of the national agricultural produce. 
An increase in the number of investment projects and a wider sectoral 
scope may be attained through the implementation of large real estate de-
velopment projects with Chinese participation and the forging of allian-
ces with Russian large6 and medium enterprises. A possible accelerator 
(and indictor) of the incorporation of the RBW into the geoeconomic spa-
ce of the ‘Middle Kingdom’ is Chinese investment in Russia’s ports and 
other transportation and logistics facilities. However, all these projects 
are still under discussion. In view of the overall geopolitical situation and 
the growing Turkish influence in the Black Sea region, Russia should 
seek to attract Chinese businesses to the Crimean peninsula, thus partly 
lifting the geoeconomic ‘siege’. 
Despite the opportunities and priorities discussed above, it is prema-
ture to expect a rapid ‘sinofication’ of the RWB. Our partners will conti-
nue to look into the regional situation, analyse general national economic 
and political trends, and study and create ‘neighbourhood’ alternatives in 
Belarus, Ukraine and, probably, Turkey, Poland, the Baltics, and other 
countries. For decades to come, the Western borderlands will remain a 
crucial7 territory for Russia. At the same time, the country should 
continue to modernise its transport infrastructure, to make better use of 
‘targeted’ development tools (special economic zones, advanced develop-
ment territories), and to expand the ‘Chinese component’ in the place 
marketing of cities and regions. At the same time, it is important to 
consider the long-term socioeconomic and environmental interests of the 
Russian territories. 
                                                     
6 Partnerships with Chinese businesses have been forged by many companies 
‘entrenched’ in the RWB. Among them are Gazprom, EuroChem, Phosagro, 
RUSAL, the United Shipbuilding Corporation, and others. 
7 In the Concept of the Spatial Development Strategy of the Russian Federation 
until 2030, it is rightly stressed that ‘inertia will continue to skew the propor-
tions towards the West’ [54, p. 25]. 
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Conclusions 
 
In a rapidly changing Eurasia, the potential of the Chinese One Belt 
One Road Initiative cannot be ignored. Nor should it be exaggerated. It is 
very unlikely that incorporation into the scope of Chinese integration 
initiatives will meet all the overblown economic expectations of the 
moment. This holds true for both the RWB and the country as a whole. 
The stronger Russia’s geopolitical and geoeconiomic standing in the 
Eurasian space (this includes the resumption of a dialogue with the West) 
the more likely it is that the One Road One Belt Initiative will meet the 
country’s spatial development needs and contribute to the modernisation 
of its transcontinental transport and logistics network and to its various 
integration projects. The Chinese Eurasian megaproject is another in-
centive to maintain and develop the ‘eastern’ component in the develop-
ment of Russian society. In this context, a modest yet important landmark 
is growing cooperation between Russian social geographers and their 
Chinese counterparts who have been developing Russian studies at the 
universities of Beijing, Ürümqi, Xi'an, Lanzhou, Harbin, and Kunming 
and such research centres as the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the 
Institute of Russian, Eastern European, and Central Asian Studies of the 
Academy of Social Sciences of the PRC. 
 
The study was supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation, 
18-17-00112, ‘Ensuring the Economic Safety of Russia’s Western Borderlands 
amid geopolitical Turbulence’. 
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